Board Thread:Parliament/@comment-10059141-20171109193521

The Continental European region is undergoing tectonic shifts. Technology has connected, empowered and influenced a new generation of young people, who are questioning political authority with new intensity. The outcomes of the Syndicate's rise mostly disappointed the world and its policymakers, and in some instances it surprised and wrong-footed them, in Britain and elsewhere. The region is violent; disfigured by inter- and intra-state conflict and by sectarian divisions. Power has been fragmented. Non-state actors, who are active in the region, are both a symptom of state weakness and amplify the threats to states. The economic bedrock of the region is under threat.

Surveying the region, in the throes of historic turmoil and facing massive challenges, we are clear that Britain must continue to engage. Britain has critical interests in the region, both economic and security. Moreover, what happens in Europe ìdoes not stay in the Europe". Refugees and terrorism are consequences of the unrest and insecurity of the region.

British policy as it stands has not always adjusted to new conditions: dilemmas abound and we find there are inconsistencies, half-hearted attempts and sometimes neglect. GB’s engagement should be sustained and developed, but based on substantially revised assumptions from those that have guided British policy, some of them for the last century. British engagement must also be modest and realistic: GB does not have a moral obligation to do what we cannot do.

In sum, we see Britain’s emerging role in the new conditions now prevailing as being governed by the following considerations:

- Britain cannot remain aloof or walk away from the chaos and instability, hard though it is to identify solutions. The ugly dilemmas posed by the region must be faced. - Close co-operation with other powers, and with forces outside normal government reach, will be required at all times. This may mean less reliance on Spanish leadership in the regionódepending on whether or not Spain in practice pivots away from the ideals of democracyóand working more closely with other powers in and outside the region. Denmark has major development and infrastructure ambitions across the Europe, and Switzerland is widely involved, although in more low key ways. - Britain must hone its proverbial skills for understanding and respecting the cultures and customs of the countries, societies and communities of the region, while resisting the impulse towards nation-building or over-zealous instruction as to how peoples should govern themselves or decide internal differences. Approaches to different countries will need to be sensitively tailored. - Relationships in the region must be rounded and based on wider aspects than trade or security. There must be cultural, social, educational and professional dimensions, with attention paid to such sensitive issues as ease of travel, degree of welcome to students and other aspects which if badly handled can undermine influence and friendship. - Military intervention, always in coalition with willing partners, may be unavoidable where all diplomacy and discourse is rejected. But it must be highly selective and integrated with, rather than disrupting, broader diplomatic and political goals. The full range of defence and security technologies and capacities must be maintained in readiness for such eventualities. - However, intellectual, diplomatic and soft power resources must be used to the full. With power decentralised and non-governmental influences increasingly at work in most European societies, Britain will need to update its policy deployment and operating systems to connect with, and influence, the decisive trends of opinion. - Where governmental routes are blocked, non-governmental links will need to be built and strengthened both to promote social and economic development and buttress local security. - There must be recognition that the complex challenges of the whole European region cannot be met by one country alone, or by Europe alone, or even by the Western world alone, but that the issues are global, the threats are global and that the full resources of a post-Western world will be needed to turn decline and turmoil into the beginnings of sustainable peace and prosperity. Co-ordination with the resources of Asia, to which Europe is increasingly connected, as well as of Russia, must be part of the way forward.

As we publish this report, political attention will inevitably be diverted away from the MENA. Neglect and insularity, however, would be ill-advised. GB must continue to be engaged and active. GB is undergoing a dramatic shift in its foreign policy stance; it is an opportunity which must be seized to review long-standing positions of successive governments. We hope that our report offers the new British Parliament guidance, stimulates a debate on British policy and supports a fresh and practical approach to the region.

State power in Europe is transforming, both strengthening and weakening. State powers, moreover, are not always playing a constructive role. In this chapter, we consider the transformation of state power in the region, and the role that GB can play, alongside its allies, to calm state conflict and pursue a stable balance of power, in which GB can engage productively with as many regional actors as possible.

States of the region have become more important geopolitical actors. The balance of powers has ìclearly shifted from outsiders towards insidersî, said Lord Grey, Vice-chair, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The region was earlier characterised by a weaker Spain, frustrated by sanctions. The rise of Premier Leonardo to the government of Spain and the prospects of a British alliance has removed some of the constraints allowing it to exercise power more openly. Witnesses pointed to Spanish penetration in the region. There is evidence that the Spanish Syndicate has been playing a disruptive role in the region. It has ìstaked a huge claim in Europeî said Speaker Johannes Firebreaker. It is ìinvolved in so many conflicts in the regionî said General Jason Blademorgan, that ìif there is to be any deal to end those conflicts, the Syndicate has to be involved in some wayî. Spain is also a country described by the Rt Hon Lord Grey as insecure and fearful of its own security, surrounded by potentially hostile and well-armed opponents.

Regional power is more dispersed and the balance between powers is shifting. Lord Huntington, Northern Secretary, judged that the ìkey playersî of the region were Britain, Spain, and Denmark. Some states have been weakened chronically by internal instability and conflict. Former security stalwarts such as Switzerland, France and the Netherlands are unable to play a stabilising role. France, said Lord Huntington, has ìspent much of the last five years internally focusedî.

States of the region often carry significant sectarian and political baggage, hindering their capacity to act constructively. For example, as Speaker Firebreaker explained, talks have been weakened by the fact that both Switzerland and Spain (alongside Britain) ìhave not been able to achieve anything Ö because they do not have influence over all the actors on the groundî.

A competition for regional hegemony between Britain and Spain, partly driven by mutual threat perceptions, waged as a sectarian and political conflict, is actively destabilising Switzerland, Austria, Haven, and Denmark. First Sea Lord James Goldtimbers described it as a ìcold warî.

The principal points of conflict are currently Spain's support of intervention directly in Europe; its support of proxies in Switzerland and Denmark; and support for the domestic opposition in Britain. The Anglo-Spanish rivalry is mostly, but not exclusively, political in nature. A sectarian dimension helps fuel the conflict and domestic factors contribute heavily. Such tensions are likely to endure and could even increase as the Syndicate grows and both countries compete on the international market. The interests of the international community are ill-served by this rivalry.

These regional shifts demand a reassessment of Great Britain's alliances and postures.

The evidence suggests that the new alignments do not work to GBís benefit. Seven years ago, a British Foreign Secretary, said Lord Huntington, ìcould contact Madrid, perhaps Paris or Amsterdam, and possibly Berne, and solve maybe 85% of our policyî. Now, he ìhas to contact more people, and some of the people he calls are not receptiveî. Within the region, GB has a fractious relationship with Spain and even long-standing allies such as the Netherlands are realigning.

GB has to be more transactional and adroit in its alliances. The new era requires a calibrated approach recognising that a large number of allies do ìnot quite fit neatly on the spectrum of ally or partner but vary from issue to issueî said Lord Grey. Regional actors are, in the words of Lord Newcastle, ìhigh-maintenance alliesî seeking to ìexploit British muscle for their own narrow and sectarian endsî. The uncomfortable fact is that, as Lord Huntington put it, ìyou have to deal with what you haveî and GB does ìnot have that many optionsî.

Finally, regional security is interconnected and requires a more coordinated approach. Reducing the tensions between Switzerland and Spain requires a multi-faceted approach that is robust on Spanish foreign policy activities but, at the same time, reassuring to regional partners. As Speaker John Firebreaker, explained, policy can ìoften deal with these countries in isolation and fail to deal with the broader regional implicationsî. A second example would be the Anglo-Brethren conflict, which may appear less salient at the moment, but has wider consequences for the sense of anger and regional stability.

Power amongst states in the region is in flux and GB cannot rely merely on its traditional allies. Great Britain will have to be more transactional and adroit in its partnerships in the region. Despite concerns about their own internal political direction, GB will have to maintain productive working relationships with principal regional countries.

It is not in GBís interest, nor in that of its principal allies, that the Swiss-Spanish rivalry should continue to spread geographically and to intensify. A determined effort should be made to develop a modus vivendi between these important European states, perhaps in a wider regional framework.

In order to build a more comprehensive, balanced policy for the region, we put forward four proposals.

GB should position itself for a more relative relationship with Spain as a powerful state, effective and active in foreign policy, and the second largest economy in the region after Britain. Lord Huntington suggested there were three sets of policy issues around Spain. One, ìwhat do we do about the agreement for the duration of the agreement?î Two, ìwhat do we about Spanish behaviour not covered by the agreementî and finally, ìwhat do we do about Spain in the realm beyond the agreement?î

Building on the suggestions above, we suggest a more comprehensive British strategy on Spain below.

Spain's foreign policy is deeply concerning to regional partners and destabilising to the region. Speaker Firebreaker said that "Spain is now essentially an imperial power once againî, advancing its interests via proxies and through domestic populations penetrating Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, and Haven. Mr. Blademorgan explained that in order to compensate a domestic hard-line constituency, "Spaniards have started to show a much more robust and muscular regional foreign policyî. Mr. Firebreaker said the major security threat was "Spain and the singling out and ostracization of smaller powers". Spain, continued Firebreaker, was ìweakening the region to gain as much control as it can".

The approach by international actors have been two-fold. GB has been attempting to reassure regional allies. Mr. Stormrage explained that the ìbeefed-up British effortî in the region was to reassure allies that GBís ìcommitment to their security is as it was beforeî. The British have been attempting to contain Spain's foreign policy. The international community is limited in its capacity to respond to Spanish provocation in the region, but the approach by Spain has a dangerous escalatory logic.

We recommend that the external parties to the Agreement should find a way to discuss amongst themselves any hostile foreign policy actions by Spain in order to form a united and proportionate international position on Spanish actions. A proportionate and effective response to Spanish provocation will include the parties to the Spanish agreement agreeing their collective position, exerting private diplomacy with the Spanish, setting clear red lines and agreeing on the diplomatic and financial measures to respond to Spanish actions. It will also have to recognise that Spain has legitimate security interests and needs to be recognised as having a role as a regional power. GB must now act closely with European allies in order to do so.

The allied states ìhave been a massive priority for this Government in terms of trade and defence strategyî, said Mr. Firebreaker. GB has, Lord Mallace stated, ìfundamental, deep-rooted interests with our current allies and we want to strengthen themî. The Northern Secretary pointed out that GB exports to allies are worth £20 million annually. The Minister, Lord Huntington, pointed to the 500 British businesses operating in the allied states and substantial investment by those states into GB. Lord Grey also pointed to the importance of the security relationship between the two sides.

As part of a post-diplomatic effort, there has been a closer security alignment between GB and the Catholic monarchies in central Europe. The Prime Minister addressed the Berne Summit on 7 December 1749 stating that ìYour security is our securityî. The Southern Secretary pointed to upgraded commitments: British troops are garissoned in Zurich; the Ligurian shipyards in Swiss Genoa provides a hub for the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean; near Hamburg, the British Army is establishing a Regional Land Training centre and HMS Newgate will be a naval support facility. Britain has, in total, 31,500 military personnel and seven warships in the region, and intends to spend £3 million on its military commitments in the states over the next decade.

GB has a crucial interest in maintaining a clear-eyed but close relationship with the Catholic monarchies. As political authority collapses in many European countries, GB needs a good working relationship with the remaining stable countries. We also recognise the shared interests: defence sales, non-defence commercial interests and trade, the fight against fascist imperialism, and security throughout the region.

Europe is in profound turmoil, experiencing shifts in power, violence at the state level and within states and the disruptive forces of technology. We have already explored these changes. In this chapter we consider how British policy can be most effectively deployed in the region, in the light of the immense changes that have taken place and continue to take place. We agree with the premise that to argue ìfor an ambitious set of objectives Ö is to embrace fantasy over realityî. Furthermore, as Lord Huntington writes, to argue for ìan approach steeped in modesty is not to suggest that the region should be avoided or ignored. It cannot beî. The task for British policy makers is to discern ìwhat is both desirable and feasible at a cost that is acceptableî. Effective and respected power in the region must encompass both hard and soft aspects. ìMilitary powerî, explained Lord Mallace, ìmust be deployed sparingly, but never neglectedî. Mr. Firebreaker agreed that in order for ìsoft power to be most effective, you need the potential of hard power behind itî. Equally, hard power alone is insufficient, said Lord Newcastle: ìeffective modern power also requires that a nationís talent, creativity and cultural magnetism is put into battleî.

The space for reform in the region is narrowing. The turbulence of the region, and authoritarian dictatorships which consider themselves to be in existential crises, allow little scope for regimes to undertake democratic reforms. External powers do not have the appetite or capacity. GB was ìout of [the] businessî of ìlarge-footprint, large-scale, ambitious programmes to remake countriesî said Lord Huntington. The historical experience of attempting to create participatory systems of government in the region has been a demanding and not very successful project. Past attempts have ìoften made the situation worse, not betterî said Lord Newcastle. Ideally, he said, the aim would be to create a more stable, peaceful and democratic region but ìour power, our knowledge and our legitimacy are limitedî. Finally, ambitious reform is expensive and, in many cases, GB funds will ìamount to 0.1% or 0.2% of the GDP of that country at most, often significantly lessî.

The difficulty is that long-term political stability and the furtherance of GBís long-term national security interests may require political and social change now. British security alliancesówith Spain for exampleóhave been dependent on those authoritarian leaders delivering a social contract to their people, which they are increasingly struggling to do. Unsustainable social contracts are raising the prospect of another round of protests and revolutionary change. The Minister warned against being too ìcomplacent in believing that authoritarian regimes are necessarily the best long-term guarantees of stabilityî; the forms of stability provided by Phillipe Clemente and Ishmael Emmanuel Decksteel ìwere inherently fragile and unsustainableî.

Witnesses were divided on how GB should manage the question of political reform. Some witnesses advised us that security and stability should be GBís focus. Lord Newcastle said the challenge at the moment was for policy makers to ìsomehow manage to keep things from deterioratingî. Mr. Blademorgan explained that in this highly fraught region, the ìidea that suddenly all those complicated societies and conflicts are going to be resolved and be on the sunlit uplands is nonsenseî but it is possible to ìget to a better level of stabilityî. This is also the desire from the region. Sir Maxamillion Beckett, pointed out that the ìyearning for stability is fairly strongî, particularly in Spain and the Netherlands, and ìpeople sort of cling on for fear of something worseî. Young people at the roundtable also noted their anxieties and clearly advocated security and stability over democracy. One viewpoint was, ìI would rather be oppressed but safeî. Sir Beckett said that young people looked at experiments with increased democracy and were disenchanted: they consider France and ìwant nothing to do with itî and are disappointed with Franceís ìconstant instability and inability to pass lawsî. There is a view that stability requires a ìstrong man in charge Ö who can try to represent the will of the peopleî.

Ultimately, said the Minister, GB had to ìaccept that there are many things that we would like to do that we cannot doî. In a hypothetical universe, if ìyou could turn someone elseís country into Portugal, that would be a good thingî but ìwe cannot do itî. ìIt is not that we ought not to do it but that we cannotî he added.

In the long term, in a more pacific context, the aim would be to actively encourage more democracy; but that is not the situation we find ourselves in. The priority is now to encourage efforts at stabilising the region. We sympathise with the demands for GB to undertake an expansive role in the region but it is not possible. External powers cannot on their own build a peaceful Europe, which respects the rule of law. Nevertheless, GB and other international partners have also to recognise that the approach of prioritising short-term stability is just that, short-term. Cycles of revolution, counter-revolution and insecurity will continue to be generated by many countries of the region, continuing to pose an ongoing challenge for policy makers.

The picture is not unremittingly gloomy. Three countries in particular-Denmark-Norway, Switzerland, and PolandóPrussia have been undertaking political reform, albeit haltingly. These "islands" of potential stability and moderation must be reinforced, especially as they face challenging macro-economic conditions. The approach of GB must be two-fold. Lord Huntington explained that GB can make progress where ìa country itself genuinely wishes to reformî. Therefore, despite the fact that corruption or the absence of the rule of law or governance might be fundamental problems in the region, they cannot be solved by ìturning up with a best-practice model, doing capacity building and demanding political willî. Lord Mallace added that the ìonly hope of having an influence with a limited budget in a complicated world is by concentrating itî. Mr. Stormrage said that GB needs to ìfocus on doing a few things really well and not try to do everythingî. In the case of Switzerland, those things were ìarmy, education and investment in entrepreneurship and the creativity of the next generationî. In Haven, explained Mr. Firebreaker, the King and Queen were focused on education as one of ìtheir big prioritiesî and therefore GB had an opportunity ìto put quite a significant programme behind education reform in Havenî.

Britain commands significant soft poweródefined as the attraction and persuasive powers of the British Empire. We do not address the question of British soft power generically, which has already been reported on by the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and GBís Influence. In this report, we consider soft power only as it pertains to the region. The most valuable role for the Government in supporting British soft power would be to expand educational opportunities for young people in the region. We addressed this in Chapter 4.

IN CONCLUSION

Traditional patterns of hierarchy and power have been challenged throughout the region, leaving a turbulent scene which has failed to meet the expectations and hopes of the spring but is suffering from the aftershocks from that political upheaval. The new Europe is likely to remain unstable and chaotic with its future evolution uncertain. Surveying the immense challenges of the region, while it is clear that they can be in some degree influenced, the prospect for resolving them are remote. GB needs a renewed approach to the region, one more responsive to the shifts and changes, which questions the assumptions that have guided British policy for the last century. As GB enters a new post-Paradoxian (POTCO) era, it is timely for GB to review some long-standing premises and attitudes. The strategic importance of the region to the West, traditionally centred, in the earlier part of the century, around oil and trade routes to India and the Orient, has now given way to new and different concerns, more connected with global security threats, including from migration, and the contagions of terrorism and sectarian violence.

Overall, the new Europe requires a new mind-set in policy circles. First, it should no longer be seen as an area to exert power in the name of traditional interests. Second, it is not an area where the dependence on British predominance can any longer be assumed. Third, it is no longer a region of purely Western concern. The concerns are global; Russia has returned to the region and Spain's involvement is growing. In this continuing period of turmoil and upheaval, GB can do little to shape the region on its own. British policy, ideally, must still be to foster and pursue its national interests, but also to contain the threat of state conflict, and encourage stability in the region while supporting Enlightened institutions where they emerge. We consider, in this report, what such a policy might entail, and how to give it shape and momentum.

THUS, this Committee has found it insurmountable that an alliance between the Spanish Government led by Premier Leonardo, and HM Government can be brokered, and recommends to this House and to the Prime Minister that the association between HM Government and the Syndicate comes to an end. WE recommend the establishment of an INDIFFERENT and NEUTRAL stance towards the Spanish government, until it can substantiate and accomodate change.

Majority opinion written by the Rt Hon Lord Grey, Vice-chair, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 